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NOTES
LIABILITY OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE
MANUFACTURERS: NO LONGER A PINK ELEPHANT
Water is best.1
Governments have long recognized the need to protect their citi-
zens from the ill effects of alcohol. In 1641, for example, King
Charles sent instructions to Sir William Berkeley, Governor of Vir-
ginia, that "any... liquors, such as may endanger the health of the
people, and shall so be found upon the Oaths of sufficient persons
appointed for the Tryall, That the Vesell be Staved."'2 Today, re-
cently passed federal legislation may insulate alcoholic beverage
manufacturers from liability for the dangers inherent in their
products.3 Although the new statute requires manufacturers to put
several health warnings on alcoholic beverage containers, it also
contains language that could preempt an inadequate warning suit
against the manufacturers.4 The preemption language is arguably
1. Pindar, Olympian Odes (quoted in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF QUOTA-
TIONS 10 (1986)).
2. Hutt & Hutt, A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding
of Food, 39 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 2, 37 (1984). The concern in King Charles' time was with
adulterated beverages, not with the inherent dangers of otherwise "safe" liquors. Id.
3. Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 4518 (to be codified at 27 U.S.C. §§ 201, 213-19). Congress passed
the Act Oct. 21, 1988, as part of the Omnibus Anti-Substance Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1989). It went into effect one year later. Id.
4. 134 CONG. REc. S17,300 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Ford). Senator
Wendell Ford of Kentucky, one of the Act's sponsors, said that his understanding was that
the preemption language of section 205 of the law was "to be red [sic] and administered so
as to preclude any State or local authority, through legislation, regulation, or judicial inter-
pretation, from requiring a different warning lable [sic] on beverage alcohol containers." Id.
at S17,301. Senator Strom Thurmond, one of the Act's principal authors and sponsors, said
that he viewed the language as
a narrow preemption relating to statements on containers, or boxes, cartons
and packages which contain such containers. It does not in any way prevent
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unnecessary. Very few courts have been willing to apply strict lia-
bility's "unreasonably dangerous product" or "inadequate warn-
ing" analysis to alcoholic beverages,5 even though statistics indi-
cate that alcohol's risks outweigh its utility, and that some form of
warning is needed because of a lack of public knowledge about the
risks of alcohol use and abuse.6
The main obstacle to inadequate warning suits against manufac-
turers of alcoholic beverages is that the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which many states consider very persuasive authority, uses
alcohol as an example of a product to which courts cannot apply
inadequate warning analysis because the dangers of alcoholic bev-
erages are purportedly commonly known. 7 In most recently re-
ported cases, courts have held that the Restatement's reasoning
precluded strict liability claims against alcoholic beverage manu-
the alcoholic beverage industry from voluntarily providing further consumer
information. Moreover, the preemption should not be construed to indicate
that the States do not have the authority in other areas-such as industry ad-
vertisement, warning posters, and other educational campaigns-to protect the
health and safety of their citizens.
Id. at S16,008 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988).
5. See infra notes 81-92, 104-18, 136-46 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A says: "One who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property .... " Id.
Comment i says:
Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption,
and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from over-
consumption .... The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it ....
Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some
people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics ....
Id. comment i.
Comment j says:
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the
seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its
use.... [A] seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredi-
ents in them, which are only dangerous ... when consumed in excessive quan-
tity, or over a long period of time, when the danger... is generally known and
recognized. Again, the dangers of alcoholic beverages are an example ....
Id. comment j.
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facturers for inadequately warning of the dangers inherent in their
products."
This Note argues that courts should hold alcoholic beverage
manufacturers liable for the injuries their products cause, and that
courts cannot rely on the Restatement's pronouncement of what is
common knowledge.9 The Note begins with an examination of the
recent warning label legislation and the potential effect of its pre-
emption language10 on products liability suits. Because the Act's
preemption language is not retroactive and therefore would not af-
8. See infra notes 81-92, 104-18, 136-46 and accompanying text; see also Annotation,
Products Liability: Alcoholic Beverages, 42 A.L.R. 4th 253, 256 (1985) ("Manufacturers of
alcoholic beverages do not have a duty to warn the consumer of the possible ill effects of the
beverage, the courts' reasoning that the ill effects of alcohol are so well known that no warn-
ing is necessary."). In M. MOORE & D. GERSTEIN, ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY: BEYOND THE
SHADOW OF PROHIBITION 6-7 (1981), the authors attribute the policies underlying the ALR
cases and the Restatement to a misconception of alcohol abuse. They explain:
Current policy is profoundly shaped by a body of conventional wisdom, includ-
ing the belief that alcohol problems are created largely by a small group of
alcoholics who require intensive, prolonged treatment and that any effort to
restrict drinking practices in the general population is doomed to failure. The
power of these ideas is apparent in that they are widely treated as the most
obvious and incontrovertible facts .... Simplification inevitably distorts our
perception of a problem.
Id.
The theory behind a duty to warn case is that the nature of the product carries the im-
plicit representation of safety. One commentator noted, "Even if the defendant has said
nothing about his product, the product itself makes, by its very appearance, certain implied
representations about both its use and its limitations. The question is always whether the
initial false impressions created by the product are neutralized . . . by further disclosures
.... " R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 94 (1980). A product made for human
consumption, particularly a beverage that will be consumed often, would seemingly carry a
greater implicit representation of safety than most other products.
9. For related discussions, see Britt, Alcohol Manufacturer's Duty to Warn, 38 FED'N INS.
& CORP. COUNS. Q. 247 (1988) (arguing that the Restatement's position toward the dangers
of alcohol use must be reexamined as to fetal alcohol syndrome and alcohol-drug interac-
tions because the public is "largely ignorant" of those risks); Note, A Case for Alcohol Bev-
erage Warning Labels: Duty to Warn of Dangers of Consumption, 53 Mo. L. REv. 557
(1988) (discussing a chronology of cases in which the courts held that the dangers of alcohol
are commonly known); Note, Mitigating Alcohol Health Hazards Through Health Warning
Labels and Public Education, 63 WASH. L. REV. 979 (1988) (arguing that warning labels and
public education are effective tools for battling alcohol abuse); Note, A Spirited Call to
Require Alcohol Manufacturers to Warn of the Dangerous Propensities of Their Products,
11 NOVA L.J. 1611 (1987) (arguing that the issue of common knowledge of the risks of alco-
hol should be presented to the jury).
10. See Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 205, 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 4518, 4520 (to be codified at 27 U.S.C. § 216).
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fect claims in which damages were suffered before enactment,11 the
Note then discusses possible avenues of action against alcoholic
beverage manufacturers in claims for damages suffered before the
legislation became effective.
The Note addresses three situations for possible claims involving
alcohol use: the effects of long term alcohol use, death by acute
alcohol poisoning, and drunk driving. It contrasts the reasoning
courts have used to dismiss and to uphold actions against alcoholic
beverage manufacturers in recent cases involving these three
scenarios."
Additionally, the Note examines the applicability of a second
theory of action, breach of express warranty, against alcoholic bev-
erage manufacturers. A breach of express warranty claim recently
earned a plaintiff $500,000 in his suit against cigarette manufactur-
ers in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 3 The verdict in the Cipol-
lone case is significant because of the strong analogy between alco-
hol and tobacco products, particularly because the Restatement
mentions both tobacco and alcohol as products whose dangers are
supposedly commonly known.14
THE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LABELING ACT
The most remarkable aspect of Congress' passage of the Alco-
holic Beverage Labeling Act, which requires several health warn-
ings on alcoholic beverage labels, is that the legislature took so
long to pass the bill. Congressmen have introduced similar legisla-
tion off and on since the mid-1960s. 15 In all likelihood, Congress'
11. See S. Rep. No. 596, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-14 (1988).
12. See infra notes 81-161 and accompanying text.
13. 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988).
14. See supra note 7. Regarding tobacco products, the Restatement provides: "Good to-
bacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful
... ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965).
15. For example, Senator Strom Thurmond first introduced a health warning bill in 1967.
S. REP. No. 596, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988). He introduced another warning label bill in
1979 that eventually died in a conference committee. Rubin, The Bad News About Booze,
60 Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 4, 5 (1987). Representative George E. Brown, Jr., introduced similar
legislation in the House in 1980 that died in the Committee for Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce. H.R. 8407, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). Three years later, a similar proposal by
Brown went to the Energy and Commerce Committee, H.R. 3077, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983), with a similar death in 1984. H.R. 2656, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). A coalition of
senators introduced a version of the current bill in 1986. S. 2595, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132
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failure to act is attributable to strong lobbying by alcoholic bever-
age manufacturers. Little else explains Congress' neglect of its con-
stituents, an overwhelming majority of whom have favored health
warnings on liquor labels since at least 1984.16 The fact that Sena-
tor Wendell Ford of Kentucky negotiated the current Act's pre-
emption language17 is particularly telling because Kentucky pro-
duces ninety percent of the nation's bourbon."
The Act requires a label that incorporates several health and
safety warning messages. The label must state that drinking by a
pregnant woman increases health risks to her unborn child, im-
pairs the drinker's ability to drive or operate machinery, and "may
cause health problems." 9 Furthermore, according to the Act, "No
statement relating to alcoholic beverages and health, other than
the statement required... shall be required under State law to be
placed on any container of an alcoholic beverage .... "2 The Act's
preemption language prevents states from requiring any other
warning on alcoholic beverage labels. The Act's sponsors, however,
disagree on the preemptive effect of the language used.
Preemption Analysis
Congress may preempt state law expressly by statement, or im-
plicitly by indicating its interest "'to occupy a field'" in a given
area of the law.2' The latter determination depends on whether
CONG. REC. S9,331 (daily ed. July 21, 1986). The coalition comprised Senators Thurmond,
Edward M. Kennedy and Orrin G. Hatch. Rubin, supra, at 6.
16. 132 CONG. REC. S9,331 (daily ed. July 21, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). When
he introduced the 1986 version of the current Act, Senator Thurmond cited a 1984 Roper
survey of alcohol problems that said 64% of the nation's business, government and military
leaders, and 68% of the general public endorsed warning label requirements on alcoholic
beverages. Id. at S9,332.
17. 134 CONG. REC. S17,300 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Ford).
18. Id.
19. Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 204(a), 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 4518, 4519 (to be codified at 27 U.S.C. § 215).
20. Id. § 205, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 4518, 4520 (to be codified
at 27 U.S.C. § 216).
21. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3rd Cir. 1986) (quoting Fidelity
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)). The power to preempt
state law is ultimately tied to the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313 (11th Cir.
1987).
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federal regulation of the field is "'so pervasive as to make reasona-
ble the inference that Congress left no room for the States to sup-
plement'" the federal scheme.22 In some cases, a federal law may
not entirely preclude state participation in the legislation's area of
operation. When state law is not completely preempted, it is pre-
empted to the extent that it conflicts with the federal law. 3
Some courts determine the extent of federal preemption by ex-
amining the impact of a state court's ruling on the federal regula-
tions. As one court noted, "[If the state law disturbs too much the
congressionally declared scheme . . . it will be displaced through
the force of preemption. '24 For this analysis, courts must look to
the policies of the federal regulation and whether they are aided or
hindered by the state law.25 In making a preemption determina-
tion, however, a court must impose a heavy presumption that Con-
gress did not intend to preempt state law.26
Comments by senators and representatives about the Alcohol
Beverage Labeling Act are virtually unanimous in stating that the
Act is designed to further public health goals27 and to "remind the
American public about the possible hazards that may result from
alcohol consumption or abuse. ' 28 The Act itself also mentions "the
health and safety of the Nation's population" 29 as a chief congres-
sional concern. Fueling arguments for preemption, the Act states
clearly that it intends to provide "national uniformity" for warning
labels "to avoid the promulgation of incorrect or misleading infor-
mation and to minimize burdens on interstate commerce. '30
However, many of the Act's sponsors apparently contemplated
state law tort actions against alcoholic beverage manufacturers.
For example, Senator Strom Thurmond, who introduced the origi-
22. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 185 (quoting De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153).
23. Id.
24. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir. 1987).
25. Id.
26. Cipolone, 789 F.2d at 185 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981)).
27. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. E3,729 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (extension of statement of
Rep. Waxman) (The warning requirement "represents only a small part of our efforts to
discourage the abuse of alcohol and reduce the impact of abuse on public health.").
28. 134 CONG. REC. S17,359 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
29. Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 202, 1988 U.S. CODE




nal bill with language specifying that it did not intend to preempt
state law claims, described the Act's language as "a narrow
preemption."'"
Comments by other congressmen flesh out Senator Thurmond's
interpretation of the preemption language. For example, Represen-
tative Henry A. Waxman, speaking of the House version of the
Senate's bill, said the Act preempts states from the field of warn-
ing label requirements in the interests of uniformity of labeling re-
quirements and the availability of other means of achieving state
goals.32 He suggested, however, that states could regulate the alco-
holic beverage industry's advertising,33 a significant suggestion be-
cause it supports an inference that Congress does not intend to
preempt breach of warranty claims.34 Representative Waxman also
said that "the legislation does not affect the duty that manufactur-
ers, bottlers, and sellers of alcoholic beverages have to inform and
warn the public through all appropriate means of any known
hazards associated with their product .... Nor can there be any
question about the authority of courts to enter judgments with re-
spect to warnings other than those directly on the labels of
containers. '35
Paradoxically, Representative Waxman also indicated that the
Act does not preempt actions for liability at all. "[I]t was not Con-
gress' intent to affect the liability of manufacturers either posi-
tively or negatively,"3 he said.
Expanding on Representative Waxman's statements, Represen-
tative John Conyers, Jr., of Michigan, a House sponsor of the Act,
said that its preemption language establishes "a floor for safe con-
duct; it should not be construed ... as a ceiling for or a limit on
31. Supra note 4.
32. 134 CONG. REC. E3,729 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (extension of statement of Rep. Wax-
man). Representative Waxman also said, "It is critical that the States, which have primary
authority for the regulation of alcohol sales, adopt additional policies and programs which
will reduce the toll of alcoholism and alcohol abuse on our communities." Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. ("[C]ertain advertising practices might be found to undermine the public percep-
tion of the Federal health warning label."); see infra notes 178-93 and accompanying text.
35. 134 CONG. REc. at E3,729.
36. Id. The Act "deals only with warning labels, not liability. There is no mention of
liability or immunity in the legislation or in the Senate committee report. The omission was
deliberate and reflects Congress' unwillingness to interfere in product liability actions." Id.
1989]
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safe conduct.... Most importantly, it should not be seen as re-
flecting any intent to prevent the States from compensating alco-
hol victims and encouraging the manufacturers to adopt more ade-
quate warnings through traditional product liability litigation and
remedies. '37
On the other hand, Senator Ford views the preemption language
broadly. "This preemption recognizes that the effectiveness of the
warning label contained in the act would be diminished if other,
perhaps conflicting, statements were allowed to be added to alco-
holic beverage containers," Ford said, adding that "[sitate and lo-
cal governments are therefore precluded from imposing their own
requirements ..... ,s Ford, who negotiated the inclusion of the
preemption language,39 described the language as "critical to the
success" of the Act.40
If the preemption language is as narrow as some of its sponsors
indicate, then the Act will have little effect on an inadequate warn-
ing claim. Those sponsors' comments are significant because they
indicate that Congress contemplated the viability of inadequate
warning claims against alcoholic beverage manufacturers. In fact,
the preemption language itself supports the viability of inadequate
warning claims because, if the dangers of alcohol were common
knowledge, no need to preempt inadequate warning claims would
exist; the claims would be inherently untenable.41
37. Id. at E3,763 (extension of statement of Rep. Conyers). Representative Conyers said:
State tort damages actions would not hinder the accomplishment of Congress'
purposes .... Courts should interpret this statute as one which establishes
minimum regulatory objectives in the area of alcohol warning labels. A State
court may rule that this act's label is inadequate under State law, even though
the labels meet Federal requirements, if the trier of fact decides that the label
fails to warn against the foreseeable, significant risk. It need not be assumed
that the company can be held liable for failure to warn only if the State could
have required a company to alter its warning.
Id. at E3,764.
Representative Conyers suggested that despite the Act's preemption language, a state can
indirectly "control the use of alcohol for compensatory reasons by holding alcohol producers
liable for injuries that could have been prevented by a more adequate label." Id. Further, he
said, "warning labels cannot be considered adequate for health hazards that [the labels] do
not specify." Id.
38. 134 CONG. REC. S17,301 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. Ford.).
39. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
40. 134 CONG. REc. at S17,301.
41. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the Act will not preempt a state law claim if the
claim does not conflict with the goals of promoting health or uni-
formity of warning requirements. Because the effect of allowing
state law claims against alcoholic beverage manufacturers could
not logically thwart health goals, the only valid concern is that
state court judgments might upset the desired "uniformity" for
warning labels. On the other hand, even if the Act's language is so
broad as to preempt post-Act inadequate warning claims, it should
have no effect on actions for damages incurred before the Act's
passage, because those suits would in no way conflict with the
stated congressional goals.
Pre-Act Damages
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,42 the court allowed the
plaintiff to sue for damages incurred before 1965, the year in which
Congress passed a federal law mandating health warnings for ciga-
rette labels. The 1965 law contained preemption language similar
to that found in the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act. 43 The court
in Cipollone found that the cigarette labeling law could not pre-
empt a claim for injuries incurred before the law's passage.44 Al-
though the plaintiff in Cipollone failed to recover on his inade-
quate warning claim because the jury apportioned to his deceased
wife more than fifty percent of the fault for her injuries,45 the case
supports an argument for sustaining a claim for damages incurred
before the passage of the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act.
Because the Act does not indicate any intent for retroactive ap-
plication, it cannot preclude claims for injuries incurred before its
passage. At the very least, this alcoholic beverage labeling legisla-
tion provides a legislative nod to warning labels as effective means
for educating the public about the health risks of drinking.4" The
legislation acknowledges a current social harm and a remedy for
42. 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988).
43. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1965).
For the preemption language mandated for alcoholic warning labels, see supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
44. Cipollone, 693 F. Supp. at 210; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181
(3d Cir. 1986).
45. Cipollone, 693 F. Supp. at 210.
46. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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the future. It does not attempt, nor should it preclude, compensa-
tion for past harm.
Unfortunately, the Act's potential preemptive effect is a small
obstacle compared to that posed by the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. The Restatement's blanket pronouncement that the dangers
of alcohol consumption are common knowledge presents a much
larger hurdle, over which few inadequate warning claims have been
able to jump.
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SECTION 402A
The Restatement's section 402A allows products liability suits
against manufacturers that put on the market defective products
that are "unreasonably dangerous. 47 A product that "is safe only
in limited doses" may be defective when the manufacturer fails to
give adequate warning of the product's danger.48 The Restatement
recognizes, however, that manufacturers cannot make some prod-
ucts entirely safe for consumption. For the products to be "unrea-
sonably dangerous," they must be "dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
.... "49 The Restatement also offers the risks of drinking alco-
holic beverages as an example of dangers that are commonly
known.50
The Restatement's use of the risks of alcohol use as an example
of common knowledge causes most of the trouble for plaintiffs
when they ask courts to apply inadequate warning analysis to suits
involving alcoholic beverages. Most courts follow the Restate-
ment's analysis step-by-step and then balk at the plaintiff's claim
when they reach the question of whether the dangers of alcohol are
commonly known.51 The courts do not evaluate the claims substan-
tively, but rely instead on the blanket statement by the Restate-
ment's comments that the risks of drinking are commonly known.2
47. See supra note 7.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1965).
49. Id. comment i; see supra note 7.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965).
51. See, e.g., infra notes 81-92, 109-24, 142-54 and accompanying text.
52. Id.
[Vol. 31:157
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The Restatement issued the equivalent of ungrounded dicta.5 3
Medical technology has advanced to a point at which the causal
connection between the consumption of alcohol and many of its
effects cannot be labeled common knowledge. Science has uncov-
ered a number of esoteric connections between alcohol consump-
tion and health. Additionally, many beliefs about alcohol must be
modified as science shakes their foundations. One can no longer
say accurately, for example, that only excessive and prolonged use
of alcohol leads to health problems. Even moderate use of alcohol,
over time, can lead to a variety of disorders. Regardless of medical
technology, however, the law is on shaky ground whenever it
presumes to state that something is unequivocally a matter of com-
mon knowledge. Such matters, by definition, should be decided by
a jury, which as a trier of fact represents community judgment.
AN ASSESSMENT OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND RISK/UTILITY
ANALYSIS APPLIED TO INADEQUATE WARNING CLAIMS
How Commonly Known Are the Risks of Alcohol Consumption?
"Americans are less knowledgeable about the adverse effects of
alcohol on health ... than they are about the harmful effects of
smoking."'54 In a report to the President and Congress on the
53. The Restatement's position-is particularly ironic in light of some authors' interpreta-
tion that § 402A's governing policy is "grounded in economic reality." J. BEASLEY, PRODUCTS
LIABLrY AND THE UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS REQUIREMENT 60 (1981). Fleshing out the pol-
icy behind the Restatement's defective products/inadequate warning section, Beasley said:
The best way to protect the consumption-oriented public from senseless injury
is to place the burden on the enterprise profiting from the consumers. The
manufacturer is in the best position to bear the risk of injury from product
deficiency. It can do so without substantial economic detriment by spreading
the cost of injury ... over the entire spectrum of its products by a proportion-
ate increase in the selling price of the average unit.
Id. at 60-61.
Considering the minuscule cost of label warnings, see infra notes 76-77 and accompanying
text, deciding the issue of common knowledge as a matter of law flies in the face of the
Restatement's own policies.
54. Seessel, Should Liquor Have Warning Labels?, Wash. Post, July 2, 1986, at A23, col.
3. Additionally, one commentator said:
To the millions of individuals who become alcohol abusers, alcoholic beverages
have properties that cause the user to misperceive alcohol's effect on him and
eventually undermine his ability to assume the risks of continued use. Alco-
holic beverages are not only addictive, but release sensations of freedom,
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health hazards of drinking, the United States Departments of the
Treasury and Health and Human Services concluded that the pub-
lic is not sufficiently aware of the specific health effects of short
and long term alcohol use.55 The report said that the risks of alco-
hol overdose and other health hazards are not commonly known.5
Surveys indicate just how knowledgeable Americans are of long
term risks. For example, only thirty-three percent of those sur-
veyed by the National Center for Health Statistics knew that alco-
hol was associated with cancers of the throat and mouth.17 Only
forty-eight percent knew that heavy drinking during pregnancy in-
creased the risk of birth defects.5
Matching these surveys up with conclusions of the scientific
community about specific dangers of alcohol consumption clouds
the issue of how commonly known these risks are. For example,
alcohol is implicated in a variety of cardiovascular disorders, in-
cluding phlebitis, varicose veins and angina pectoris.5 9 Evidence
links two drinks per week by pregnant women with spontaneous
power, heightened popularity, and so forth-sensations that belie the actual
damages of the product and render them far from obvious to the user.
Rubin, supra note 15, at 7. Furthermore, the author said, "[s]ince ... alcohol is a mind-
altering substance which directly affects the user's mental perceptions (and ability to as-
sume the risks of continued use), alcohol [should be a suitable] vehicle for product liability
initiatives .... " Id. at 8.
55. U.S. DEP'TS OF TREASURY AND HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND CONGRESS ON HEALTH HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH ALCOHOL AND METHODS TO INFORM THE
GENERAL PUBLIC OF THESE HAZARDS (Comm. print, Nov. 1980) [hereinafter TREASURY AND
HHS REPORT]. The Report, relying on 1978 data, said that one in twelve people surveyed
believed that the regular use of alcohol posed no risk to the user. Id. at 34. The report said:
"People are insufficiently aware that consumption of large amounts of alcohol in a short
period of time, such as may occur in a drinking contest, can cause death. They are also
unaware that drinking can cause or contribute to ... various health hazards .... Id.
56. Id.
57. Seessel, supra note 54.
58. Rubin, supra note 15, at 4-5. Nearly 60% of those surveyed had never heard of fetal
alcohol syndrome, the nation's third leading cause of birth defects. Id. Rubin also said that
although the term "alcoholism" is commonly used to describe a variety of conditions, the
term is not commonly understood. Id. at 7. Addressing the "common knowledge" bar to
products liability suits, he concluded that "if the dangers and dynamics of alcohol-related
problems such as alcoholism, fetal alcohol syndrome, and teenage alcohol abuse are not gen-
uinely understood by the public, members of the alcoholic beverage industry may have a
common law duty to warn the public about the dangers of their products." Id.
59. L. WEST, ALCOHOLISM AND RELATED PROBLEMS 10 (1984).
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abortions,"0 and medical experts link even moderate drinking by
pregnant women to low birth weight, behavioral dysfunction and
impaired motor and mental skills of their children. 1 Alcohol abuse
is the most common cause of nutritional problems such as vitamin
and trace element deficiencies in adults.6 2 These nutritional defi-
ciencies can lead to anemia, convulsions, small bowel dysfunction
and brain disorders.63
Because surveys and instincts suggest that at least some of these
disorders are not commonly known,6 4 courts have no business de-
ciding that alcohol's attendant risks are commonly known as a
matter of law; that decision is the jury's to make. Furthermore, the
traditional risk/utility analysis of products liability suggests that
courts should not automatically insulate alcohol manufacturers
from liability.
Risk/Utility Analysis Applied to Alcoholic Beverages .
When a court decides that a product is not defective as a matter
of law, it is making a policy decision. Implicit in its dismissal of the
suit is the court's decision that the product's dangers do not out-
weigh its benefits.6 5 Courts also use risk/utility balancing to deter-
mine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.66 Examining
whether a product is more dangerous than a consumer would ex-
pect is an alternate method of making this determination, although
60. TREASURY AND HHS REPORT, supra note 55, at iv.
61. See 134 CONG. REc. S16,008-09 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond).
62. TREASURY AND HHS REPORT, supra note 55, at v.
63. Id.
64. Additional potential health consequences of drinking have been found. "Alcohol mis-
use has a potentially detrimental effect on the body from its point of entry at the mouth
through the entire gastrointestinal tract and to related organs such as the liver and the
pancreas." Id. An association between alcohol and depression exists, and one-third of all
suicides involve alcohol. Id. Even for light drinkers, the risk of hemorrhage or stroke is more
than double the risk for abstainers. Seessel, supra note 54. Heavy drinkers suffer a 300%
greater likelihood of death from strokes. L. WEST, supra note 59, at 10.
65. See, e.g., Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510 (3rd Cir. 1987). The court in this
case termed the risk/utility analysis "social policy considerations." Id. at 513; see also Wade,
On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551, 568 (1980)
("[S]afety must be a relative matter, and a balancing process of some sort is necessary to
determine whether a product is sufficiently safe .... ).
66. 2 TRAVERS, ArmPcAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABIiTy 3D § 17.22 (1987).
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some courts use a combination of these approaches.6 7 An examina-
tion of the risks and benefits of alcoholic beverages makes it diffi-
cult to accept an off-the-cuff dismissal of a products liability suit
against alcoholic beverage manufacturers for inadequate warnings
on beverage containers. 8
The following facts illustrate the "human cost"-i.e., the prod-
uct's risks-of alcohol use and abuse in America: Alcohol costs the
American economy nearly $120 billion annually in expenses includ-
ing increased medical expenses and decreased productivity of the
work force; 9 one in ten deaths annually is alcohol related;70 about
67. Id. One author said that courts should base their evaluation of a duty to warn on:
the nature of the product and the harm risked, the information available to the
seller or supplier, the user's information, the position of the seller or supplier
in the chain of distribution, the cost or other burden of adding efficacious
warnings or instructions, the probability that harm will result from the absence
of warnings or instructions, and the causal relation between the absence or
inadequacy of warnings or instructions and the harm suffered.
Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criticism, 89 W. VA. L.
REv. 221, 225 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
68. For arguments against imposing a duty to carry warnings, see Goodman, We Use
Warnings as Excuses, Wash. Post, Oct. 29, 1988, at A27, col. 1. Goodman said that rather
than offering protection, when society mandates warning requirements the result is that
[w]e let the consumer beware. The irony in this approach is that the warning is
often better protection for the producer than the consumer, whether it's the
producer of cigarettes, movies or sweeteners. The cigarette labels [required by
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341
(1965)] didn't stop many from smoking, but they protected the companies
from lawsuits.
Id. Goodman argued that warnings place "the onus... on the individual to make an unend-
ing series of health decisions and risk assessments merely to get through the day .... We
often accept the notion that our health and safety are merely a matter of proper warning
and personal choice." Id. She concluded: "In this world, warnings are often used as an ex-
cuse. Maybe this announcement should carry a warning label of its own. Caution: Even
warnings can be hazardous for our public health." Id.
69. 134 CONG. REc. S16,008 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); see
132 CONG. REC., S9,331, S9,332 (daily ed. July 21, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (say-
ing the adverse consequences of alcohol use are "one of our most serious health problems..
The following facts illustrate other human costs of alcohol use: More than 50% of all
traffic deaths are alcohol related. Id. Fetal alcohol syndrome is present in two of every 1,000
live births. As many as 36,000 newborns each year show signs of the disease. Britt, supra
note 9, at 255. Fetal alcohol syndrome is considered to be the third leading cause of birth
defects and the only leading cause that is preventable. 134 CONG. REc. at S16,008. Approxi-
mately $670 million each year is spent to treat the nation's children who suffer from fetal
alcohol syndrome and more than $760 million annually is spent to treat the nation's adults
who suffer from fetal alcohol syndrome. 132 CONG. REc. at S9,332.
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one-third of adult patients in hospitals have alcohol related
problems;7 1 about 12 million adults have symptoms of alcoholism;72
and more than 18 million adults have more than two drinks per
day.7 3
Arguably, the sole utility of alcohol is the pleasure derived by
drinking. Alcoholic beverages serve no utilitarian function other
than recreational purposes. 4 Although courts are willing to dismiss
products liability claims against alcoholic beverage manufacturers,
"[iut is by no means clear that the pleasure people derive from al-
cohol outweighs the cost in human lives imposed by alcohol
abuse. 17 5 Risk/utility analysis leads to the conclusion that alcoholic
beverages are both "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous."
The "human cost" of alcohol is especially appalling when con-
trasted with the economic cost of warning labels. For example, the
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, as amended in 1984, costs
cigarette manufacturers an estimated $1 million annually, or about
0.0004 cents per cigarette pack.76 Although figures are not available
for the cost of warning labels on alcoholic beverages, the fact that
the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act is more complex than
Additional human costs include the fact that exposure to alcohol can lead to dependence,
TREASURY AND HHS REPORT, supra note 55, at vi; 4.5 million children between the ages of
14 and 17 have experienced problems associated with alcohol abuse, Rubin, supra note 15,
at 4; alcohol is a factor in 15% of the nation's health care expenditures, Seessel, supra note
54; alcohol related causes account for between 100,000 and 200,000 deaths annually, id.;
alcohol related traffic accidents are the leading cause of death among 15- to 24-year-olds, id.;
alcohol is the most widely abused chemical in the Western world and is "implicated in far
more deaths than any other substance," L. WEST, supra note 59, at 9; as a poison, alcohol is
second only to carbon monoxide in annual deaths in the United States, id.; approximately
10% of the 100 million Americans who drink "have significant alcohol related problems
affecting their work, family life, social adjustment, or health." Id. at 2; see 132 CONG. REc. at
S9,331, S9,332.
70. L. WEST, supra note 59, at 2.
71. See Seessel, supra note 54.
72. Rubin, supra note 15, at 4.
73. 132 CONG. REc. at S9,332.
74. O'Shea, Alcohol and Tobacco Manufacturers and Sellers: Liability in a Post-Alvis
Era, 73 ILL. B.J. 510, 512 (1985).
75. Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1912, 1918-19 (1984).
76. Ross, Judicial and Legislative Control of the Tobacco Industry: Toward a Smoke-
Free Society?, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 317, 326 n.51 (1987).
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the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act 7 7 suggests that labels on alco-
holic beverages will cost even less.
That the benefits of warning labels on alcoholic beverages out-
weigh their minimal cost is beyond reasonable dispute. Congress
apparently agrees, as indicated by its passage of the federal alco-
holic beverage labeling law. Other evidence of labeling's efficacy in-
cludes a report submitted by the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, which said that a warning label re-
quirement would "inform the public regarding health hazards" and
"promot[e] the health and safety of the American people. 7  The
Committee believes that warning labels are an effective way to in-
form the public of the risks of alcohol use and, given the minimal
cost of the labels themselves, the informational benefit of the la-
bels outweighs that cost. Furthermore,.although "[i]t is always pos-
sible in principle to argue that any mishap could have been pre-
vented in advance, cheaply and effectively, by some warning or
instruction that the defendant might have given but did not
give," 1 9 a cost/benefit analysis of requiring labels combined with a
risk/utility analysis of the product prevents the overuse of duty to
warn claims.80 Given the risks involved with alcohol use, the mini-
77. The Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act requires four labels to be randomly ro-
tated among the manufacturer's products. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1965). The Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act requires only one label
that incorporates several general warnings. See supra notes 3, 4, 9 & 10, and text accompa-
nying notes 3 & 4.
78. S. REP. No. 596, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988).
79. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 93.
80. See id. at 95. To prevent the overuse of duty to warn claims, "it must be asked in
every case whether the benefits [the warnings] create justify the administrative costs that
they impose." Id.
The theory behind a duty to warn case, Epstein said, is that the nature of the product was
such that it carried the implicit representation of safety.
Even if the defendant has said nothing about his product, the product itself
makes, by its very appearance, certain implied representations about both use
and its limitations. The question is always whether the initial false impressions
created by the product are neutralized either by further disclosures or by other
features of the product design.
Id. at 94. Applying that reasoning to alcoholic beverages, the strongest case for implied rep-
resentations of safety comes from products that are to be consumed. The danger of an alco-
holic beverage is the alcohol itself. Epstein said that when a design change would not be
effective
the question then is whether the manufacturer has supplied the consumer or
user with sufficient knowledge of the product to take specific precautions on
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mal cost of general health warning labels, and congressional recog-
nition that health warning labels are an effective means of altering
consumer behavior, little room remains for argument that manu-
facturers should not be liable for failing to provide warning labels
on alcoholic beverages.
THREE SCENARIOS FOR INADEQUATE WARNING LIABILITY
Three common scenarios for products liability suits against alco-
holic beverage manufacturers are: the adverse effects of long term
drinking, acute alcohol poisoning (or alcohol overdose), and drunk
driving. In the first situation, the plaintiff claims that drinking
over an extended period caused some adverse health consequence.
In the second situation, the plaintiff claims that a relative, often a
teenager, died from drinking a large quantity of alcohol over a
short period. In the final situation, the plaintiff claims a drunk
driver injured the plaintiff.
Although the courts' standard approach to any of these three in-
adequate warning claims has been to reject the claims based on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts' comments about the common
knowledge of the risks of drinking, courts in a few recent cases
have tried to circumvent the Restatement. The following discus-
sion of recent cases involving the three scenarios, with holdings
both for and against the plaintiffs, illustrates the different ap-
proaches courts have taken toward inadequate warning claims
against alcoholic beverage manufacturers.
Long Term Effects
Garrison v. Heublein, Inc.81 involved an appeal from the dismis-
sal of a suit alleging that the plaintiff husband suffered physical
and mental injuries as a result of drinking Smirnoff Vodka over a
his own behalf. These warnings ... are of special importance when redesign is
out of the question because the product desired ... is such that its [desired]
properties are precisely those that make it dangerous.
Id. Of course, this analysis can still lead to the current situation of no liability for alcoholic
beverage manufacturers if courts continue to assume that consumers possess naturally the
requisite knowledge of the dangerous propensities of alcoholic beverages and what consti-
tutes a safe dosage.
81. 673 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1982).
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twenty-year period. 2 Although the couple sued on five theories,8 3
the crux of the plaintiffs' claim was that the defendant failed to
warn Mr. Garrison of the dangerous propensities of drinking
vodka, including that it could cause physical damage, was addic-
tive, and could affect a consumer's personality."4
The trial court said that the imposition of any duty to warn
must rest on the "'premise that liquor poses latent risks not ap-
preciated by its users.' "85 The court held that those risks in this
case were a matter of common knowledge.8 '
Giving only a cursory treatment to the claim, the appellate court
consulted the Restatement and agreed that the dangers of drink-
ing vodka are so commonly known that, as a matter of law," the
defendant's product "cannot objectively be considered to be unrea-
sonably dangerous."88 This finding is significant because, as the ap-
pellate court acknowledged, a strict liability inadequate warning
theory "involves the lowest threshold for establishing" a duty to
warn. 9 In light of such a low threshold, the court's determination
that no such duty existed is all the more bold.
The court analogized the obviousness of the dangers of long term
drinking to the dangers of using electrical arcing equipment near
power lines.90 The analogy is absurd. Although the connection be-
tween the danger of electrical shock and use of conductive equip-
ment near power lines is readily apparent, the same is not true for
the dangers of alcohol's ill effects.91 In its treatment of Mr. Garri-
82. Id. at 189.
83. The plaintiff's five theories were negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, products
liability, fraud and false and misleading advertising. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 190 (quoting trial court's dismissal order).
86. Id.
87. In Illinois, finding a duty to warn is a question of law. Id. (citing Genaust v. Illinois
Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 466, 343 N.E.2d 465, 471 (1976)).
88. Id. at 192. The court also said:
[Tihe determination of whether a duty to warn exists involves a question of
foreseeability, which must be resolved under a standard of objective reasona-
bleness.... [W]e find that even though there are dangers involved in the use
of alcoholic beverages, because of the common knowledge of those dangers, the
product cannot be regarded as unreasonably unsafe.
Id. at 191-92 (citing Genaust at 466, 343 N.E.2d at 471).
89. Id. at 190.
90. Id. at 191-92 (referring to the facts of Genaust).
91. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
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son's claim involving the effects of long term alcohol use, the court
decided as a matter of law issues that the medical community con-
tinues to debate: whether drinking warps consumers' personalities
and whether alcoholic beverages are addictive.
The court found support for its position in the explicit language
of the Restatement. Comment j reads in part: "[A] seller is not
required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients in them,
which are only dangerous.., when consumed in excessive quan-
tity, or over a long period of time, when the danger.., is generally
known and recognized." 92 The court apparently ignored the state-
ment that the danger must be "generally known and recognized,"
emphasizing only that no duty to warn of the dangers of long term
consumption exists. If courts gave the ignored language due treat-
ment, they would ask seriously whether the danger involved in the
suit was in fact "generally known and recognized." To answer that
necessarily factual question, courts must resort to the members of
the jury as representatives of the community. Committing this is-
sue to the jury is warranted especially considering that the medical
community has only recently turned its full attention to assessing
the risks and dangers of drinking. Surveys and common sense sug-
gest that many of these risks, particularly those involving long
term drinking's effects, are not commonly known. 3 In the recent
case of Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co.,94 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reasoned similarly.
In Hon, the plaintiff's 26-year-old husband died from pancrea-
titis after drinking, on average, eight to twelve beers each week for
six years.95 Prior to contracting the disease, he was in excellent
health. The plaintiff's suit included a claim that the defendant
inadequately warned the plaintiff's husband of the health effects of
long term consumption of the defendant's product. 7 Buttressing
her case, the plaintiff offered expert testimony that pancreatitis
was not a risk commonly associated with drinking and that her
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965); see supra note 7.
93. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
94. 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987).
95. Id. at 511.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 513. The plaintiff also sued for damages under a breach of express warranty
claim. See infra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.
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husband's drinking was not excessive, although it was prolonged."
She reasoned that the risks of long term alcohol use are commonly
known only when consumption is both excessive and prolonged.
Despite the fact that Pennsylvania had codified the relevant
parts of the Restatement, the court in Hon refused to hold as a
matter of law that the dangers involved were a matter of common
knowledge. First, the court used a cost/benefit analysis to decide
whether the case should go to the jury.99 Defining its deliberations
as making the "social policy considerations"' 00 underlying strict li-
ability, the court noted that in the area of inadequate warning
claims, its analysis was relatively simple. "[I]mposing the require-
ments of a proper warning will seldom detract from the utility of
the product," 10' the court said, noting that "'the cost of adding a
warning, or of making an inadequate warning adequate, will at
least.., be outweighed by the risk of harm if there is no adequate
warning.' "102 After making this finding, the court held that the
jury should resolve the issues of whether the dangers involved are
common knowledge and whether adding a warning would make the
product safe for its intended use. 103
Second, the court noted that, according to Pennsylvania law,
"[a] product can be in a defective condition not only when some-
thing has gone awry in the manufacturing or distribution process
or when the product's design is flawed, but also when a warning or
instruction needed to make the product safe for its intended pur-
98. Id. at 511. The expert testified that:
(1) the understanding shared by members of the public is that excessive and
prolonged use of alcoholic beverages is likely to result in disease, principally of
the liver; (2) Mr. Hon's case was not within the risk thus appreciated by the
public both because (a) his use was prolonged but not excessive and (b) his
disease was of the pancreas; and (3) the public's understanding is "archaic"
because medical science has now established that either excessive or prolonged,
even though moderate, use of alcohol may result in diseases of many kinds,
including pancreatic disease.
Id.
99. Id. at 512.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 513.
102. Id. (quoting Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa. Super. 22, 51, 485 A.2d
408, 423 (1984) (en banc) (footnote and citation omitted), appeal dismissed, 508 Pa. 643,




pose is missing.' 1 04 The court held that whether a needed warning
was missing was an issue for the jury, unless the plaintiff failed to
establish a factual basis for concluding that warnings were needed
to make the product safe.10 The jury would make its determina-
tion in light of what risks it considered to be common
knowledge. 08
Finally, the court circumvented the problematic issue of com-
mon knowledge by interpreting the Restatement's language, "no
warning is needed for products that are made dangerous only
'when consumed... over a long period of time, when the danger
;,. . is generally known and recognized,'" as meaning simply that
when the danger is generally known, no warning is required."'' 0
The court thus rested its decision on the circular proposition that
only the commonly known dangers of alcohol use are examples of
the Restatement's common knowledge rule. 08
Aside from the circularity of that part of its reasoning, the Third
Circuit's approach in Hon presents the strongest possibility for ap-
plying inadequate warning analysis to all alcoholic beverage cases.
The court's approach properly limits its role to making the "social
policy" decision of whether to allow the suit, without invading the
jury's domain. Members of the community should decide what is
common knowledge or generally known in the community, espe-
cially in cases like Hon, in which the plaintiff presents expert testi-
mony that the risks involved are not common knowledge. Because
of the minimal cost of warning labels and the gravity of the health
risks posed by alcohol use, the cost/benefit analysis, termed "social
policy considerations" in Hon, allows most plaintiffs to present
their claims and the common knowledge issue to the jury.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 514.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 515 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965)).
108. Id. at 515-16. The court concluded, "Thus, [the Restatement's] comment j does not
preclude liability for prolonged alcohol consumption absent a determination that the quan-
tity of alcohol consumed was sufficiently large and the period of use was sufficiently long to
present dangers that are generally known." Id. at 516.
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Acute Alcohol Poisoning
In Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co.,109 the plaintiff's
son died from acute alcohol poisoning after drinking half a bottle
of Everclear Grain Alcohol. The plaintiff sued Everclear's retailer,
wholesaler and manufacturer. The complaint alleged that the de-
fendants' product had an alcohol content far in excess of what
humans could consume safely" ° and that the defendants failed to
warn of the unreasonable risk their product presented."' Although
the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim as insufficient, the
court of appeals overturned that decision." 2 The Tennessee Su-
preme Court then overturned the court of appeals."'
Just as the federal appeals court did in Garrison, the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Pemberton relied on the Restatement's section
402A to support its dismissal of the suit."4 Quoting the dissenting
opinion in the court of appeals' decision, the supreme court said
that "'[a]lthough deceased was a minor, whether the product was
defective or unreasonably dangerous.., is determinable from...
the knowledge of the ordinary consumers of the product.' """ The
court then referred to the Restatement's comment j, which gives
the risk of excessive consumption of alcohol as an example of a
commonly known danger." 6 The court also noted that Tennessee
courts determine the existence of a duty to warn as a matter of
law. 7
The court in Pemberton further supported its position by rea-
soning that alcohol has long been recognized as toxic, and has been
"'used in society during all recorded history . , "118 Further-
109. 664 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1984).
110. Id. at 692.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 691.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 692. In addition to using the Restatement, the court relied on the Tennessee
Products Liability Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-105 (1980), the language of which is very
similar to that of the Restatement's § 402A. Pemberton, 664 S.W.2d at 692.
115. Id. at 692 (quoting dissenting opinion of appellate court in Pemberton v. American
Distilled Spirits Co., slip op. (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1982)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 693 (quoting dissenting opinion of appellate court). The court ignored, how-
ever, that "recorded history" is hardly clear or accurate on the dangers of alcohol use. The
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more, the court said, "'[c]ourts, legislatures, parents, ministers,
and temperance organizations and others have long recognized and
decried the dangers inherent in alcohol.' "119 Based on the univer-
sal use of alcohol and the claimed general understanding of the
drug's dangers, the court declared those dangers "'part of the
body of common knowledge.' ,120
A significant fact that the court did not address fully was the
special potency of the alcoholic beverage involved in this case.
Grain alcohol is usually close to 100% pure. 12 1 The potency of
grain alcohol makes it much more difficult for experienced drink-
ers, not to mention teenagers as this case involved, to gauge the
amount of alcohol consumed and its probable effects. 122 The court
merely noted, however, that "'the content of the bottle [in this
Bible, for example, perpetuates the myth that drinking is actually beneficial to one's health.
It says: "Drink no longer water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake and thine often
infirmities." 11 Thessalonians 5:23.
119. Pemberton, 664 S.W.2d at 692 (quoting dissenting opinion of appellate court).
120. Id. (quoting dissenting opinion of appellate court). The court concluded that the
risks of" 'death or serious injuries resulting from either excessive or prolonged consumption
of alcohol'" are risks for which" 'manufacturers are entitled to rely upon the common sense
and good judgment of consumers.'" Id. (quoting dissenting opinion of appellate court).
121. Everclear Grain Alcohol, bottled by Worldwide Distilled Products Co., St. Louis,
Mo., is 95% alcohol by volume. It now carries the following warning: "CAUTION!! EX-
TREMELY FLAMMABLE HANDLE WITH CARE," "WARNING!! OVER CONSUMP-
TION MAY ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH," and "CAUTION: DO NOT APPLY TO
OPEN FLAME - CONTENTS MAY IGNITE OR EXPLODE. DO NOT CONSUME IN
EXCESSIVE QUANTITIES. NOT INTENDED FOR CONSUMPTION UNLESS MIXED
WITH NON-ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE."
122. The court noted that" 'where the danger is evident to most users of a product, there
is no duty to warn an occasional, inexperienced user.'" Pemberton, 664 S.W.2d at 693
(quoting dissenting opinion of appellate court) (citations omitted). The court's definition of
what can constitute common knowledge as a matter of law was that "[flacts which are uni-
versally known may be judicially noticed provided they are of such universal notoriety and
so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming a part of the common knowl-
edge of every person." Id. (citations omitted). The court attributed the knowledge of exper-
ienced users to foreseeable neophyte consumers, which arguably runs counter to the policies
of strict liability. Comment c of § 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts says:
[T]he justification for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller, by
marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed
a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may
be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect ... that
reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that
the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption
be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production
against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of
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case] approached pure alcohol'" and then assessed only whether
the dangers of alcohol in general are commonly known, 23 not
whether the dangers of grain alcohol in particular are commonly
known.'2 4 Considerations such as these point away from deciding
as a matter of law whether the risks of excessive drinking are com-
mon knowledge.
A case factually similar to Pemberton, Brune v. Brown Forman
Corp.,125 had a different outcome. The plaintiff's daughter in
Brune, an 18-year-old college freshman, died of acute alcohol
poisoning after drinking straight shots of Pepe Lopez Tequila. 2 '
The plaintiff sued the manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer of the
liquor, claiming that although many of the risks of alcohol are
commonly known, "many teenagers are unaware that the mere in-
gestion of the drug in excess quantity can cause an overdose result-
ing in death.'1 27 The trial court granted summary judgment to the
defendants. 28 The sole issue on appeal was "whether the risk of
death resulting from acute alcohol poisoning is a matter of com-
mon knowledge to the community such that there was no duty on
the manufacturer to warn of the danger as a matter of law.' 29
Assessing the defendant's duty to warn, the appellate court said:
If a manufacturer knows or should know of potential harm to a
user because of the nature of its product, the manufacturer is
required to give an adequate warning of such dangers and pro-
such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of some-
one, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965) (emphasis added).
123. Pemberton, 664 S.W.2d at 693 (quoting dissenting opinion of appellate court).
124. Not only did the court fail to consider how commonly known are the risks of particu-
larly potent alcoholic beverages such as grain alcohol, but surveys suggest, contrary to the
court's holding, that the risk of lethal alcohol overdose is not commonly known. See supra
note 55 and accompanying text.
125. 758 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
126. Id. at 828. Significantly, the very nature of alcohol prevents a drinker from fully
appreciating the risk of acute alcohol poisoning; often the drinker is already intoxicated
before he or she rapidly consumes to fatal excess. If the drinker is intoxicated, he or she
cannot appreciate fully the risks of rapid overconsumption. See L. WEST, supra note 59, at 9
("Slow alcohol ingestion generally leads to unconsciousness before the drinker consumes
enough to reach a lethal blood level. Rapid alcohol ingestion while sober often causes vomit-
ing. However ... rapid alcohol ingestion by a person already intoxicated can be fatal.").





vide instructions for the safe use of the product. . . .This in-
cludes the duty to warn against foreseeable misuse.'
The defendant argued that no duty to warn existed because the
dangers involved were commonly known, basing its argument on
the Restatement's comments h, i and .11
The court in Brune used the same reasoning as the court in Hon
v. Stroh Brewery Co. 32 when determining the common knowledge
issue. Rather than ignore the language of the Restatement's com-
ments i and j13 3 as the court did in Hon,'34 the court in Brune
made an end run around the comments. The court reasoned that
the language of the comments specifically addressed only the dan-
gers of "general intoxication and dangers peculiar to alcoholics. '" 3 5
The comments did not, the court claimed, specifically mention the
risk of fatal overdose of alcohol as being common knowledge. Cit-
ing to Hon, the court also said that the Restatement's comment j
does not offer alcohol as an example of a product, all the risks of
which are commonly known. Rather, the court said, the Restate-
ment puts forth only the proposition that no warning is required
when the dangers involved are commonly known, and the Restate-
ment offers alcohol only as an example of a product, many of the
130. Id. (citations omitted).
131. Id.
132. 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987).
133. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The court did, however, implicitly reject
the Restatement's edict as to what constitutes common knowledge when it looked to Black's
Law Dictionary for a definition of common knowledge: "'Common knowledge ... [i]s what a
court may declare applicable to action without necessity of proof. It is knowledge that every
intelligent person has. It includes matters of learning, experience, history, and facts of which
judicial notice may be taken."' Brune, 758 S.W.2d at 830 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DicrIoNARY
250 (5th ed. 1979)). Then, the court fleshed out that definition with its own statement:
Specifically, common knowledge encompasses those facts which are so patently
obvious and so well known to the community generally, that there can be no
question or dispute concerning their existence. For instance, there can be no
dispute that there are twelve inches in a foot, that the sun rises in the morn-
ing, or even that a person drinking alcoholic beverages will become intoxicated.
On the other hand, the length of a particular object, the location of the sun at
a particular point in time, or the level of intoxication and its effect on a partic-
ular person at a specific time, all involve facts which could be subject to dis-
pute and which could never be ordinary common knowledge to the community.
Brune, 758 S.W.2d at 830-31.
134. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
135. Brune, 758 S.W.2d at 829.
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risks of which are commonly known. 136 "[W]hen read in context,"
the court in Brune said, "comment j does nothing more than ex-
tend to the duty to warn the Restatement's general exception for
cases in which the consumer knows or should know of the prod-
uct's dangerous propensities.' 13 7
Defining common knowledge as knowledge that "encompasses
those facts which are so patently obvious and so well known to the
community generally, that there can be no question or dispute con-
cerning their existence,"' 38 the court said that the risk of fatal al-
cohol overdose could not meet that definition as a matter of law.
Ironically, the court also decided in dictum what is common
knowledge about the risks of drinking. According to the court:
Although there is no question that drinking alcoholic beverages
will cause intoxication and possibly even cause illness is a mat-
ter of common knowledge, we are not prepared to hold, as a
matter of law, that the general public is aware that the con-
sumption of an excessive amount of alcohol can result in
death.13 9
The strength of the decision in Brune stems from the court's
unwillingness to hold that the dangers of excessive drinking are
commonly known as a matter of law. The court's reasoning, how-
ever, is of little use in inadequate warning claims against alcoholic
beverage manufacturers, at least to the extent that the court pur-
ported to abide by the intent of the Restatement's drafters. Appar-
ently, the court chose simply not to read language in the comments
that would preclude suits based on overconsumption."4 ° Because
the comments contain language addressing excessive consumption
of alcohol, in addition to alcohol's effects on alcoholics and alco-
hol's tendency to make one drunk,'4 ' only a suspiciously selective
reading of the Restatement would allow suits for adverse health
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 515 (3rd Cir. 1987)) (footnote
omitted).
138. Id. at 830.
139. Id. at 831.
140. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Comment j, in particular, uses alcohol as
an example of a product carrying no duty to warn of the dangers of consumption "in exces-
sive quantity." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).
141. See supra note 7.
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effects of long term drinking, drunk driving, or even acute alcohol
poisoning. Only by rejecting all of the Restatement's pronounce-
ments regarding what is common knowledge about alcohol use can
a court allow an inadequate warning claim to go to a jury. The
language of the Restatement's comments is otherwise broad
enough to preclude any such suit. As a matter of legal analysis, a
court is on stronger ground when it rejects a faulty rule than when
it ignores the rule's existence.
Drunk Driving
The plaintiff in Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co.'42 sued the manu-
facturer of the beer that a drunk driver consumed before he
crashed his car into the plaintiff's car. The drunk driver had con-
sumed an undisclosed amount of the defendant's Pabst Blue Rib-
bon Beer over a six-hour period before the crash.' 4 The plaintiff
relied in part on a claim that the manufacturer's beer was unrea-
sonably dangerous because it did not have adequate warnings or
instructions governing its use. 4
The Iowa Supreme Court relied on the comments to the Re-
statement's section 402A for its refusal to apply inadequate warn-
ing analysis to this case. 4  In response to the plaintiff's argument
that a consumer cannot be expected to know how much beer is too
much without adequate warnings-that different amounts of beer
affect different people in varying degrees-the court indicated that
the consumer has a duty to learn his own drinking limits. 46 "This
contention brings to mind the suggestion wisely advanced by Elea-
nor Roosevelt in 1932 that 'the average girl faces the problem of
learning, very young, how much she can drink of such things as
whiskey and gin, and sticking to the proper quantity,'" the court
142. 387 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 1986).
143. Id. at 567.
144. Id. at 566.
145. Id. at 569-70. After quoting pertinent parts from the Restatement's comments i and
j, the court determined that "the risks of intoxication presented to consumers of draft beer
is sufficiently known to consumers at large that the allegations of plaintiff's complaint fail to
state a claim or cognizable cause of action under Iowa law for the type of liability recognized
by section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts .. . ." Id. at 570.
146. Id. But see infra note 156.
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said.14 7 The court also said that it is not "practical to expect a
wholesale purveyor of alcoholic beverages to devise an adequate
warning of the particular tolerance of each consumer.' 148 The court
concluded that "the risks of intoxication presented to consumers of
draft beer" are commonly known.149
Several specifics of the court's analysis are suspect. For instance,
placing a duty on the consumer to learn his or her limits arguably
encourages overconsumption of alcohol. As William Blake wrote,
"You never know what is enough unless you know what is more
than enough."' 50 In order to know one's "limits," one must go be-
yond them. Furthermore, a simple label listing the correlative ef-
fects-such as the increase in blood/alcohol ratio-of a certain
number of drinks over time on a person of a specific weight is not
impractical, nor is it prohibitively expensive.' 51
In Malek v. Miller Brewing Co.,'5 2 a drunk driving case with an
outcome similar to Maguire, the plaintiff also unsuccessfully as-
serted, inter alia, that the defendant was liable for failing to warn
of the dangers of, or to provide adequate instructions, for the con-
sumption of its beer. The lower court in Malek held that the dan-
gers of drinking were commonly known thereby precluding the
plaintiff's claim for damages and injuries caused when a drunk
driver crashed her car into the plaintiff's car.153 The Texas Court
of Appeals upheld the lower court's summary judgment based on
its holding that the brewer lacked a duty to warn about its prod-
147. Maguire, 387 N.W.2d at 570. The court said that:
"[a]lthough persons engaging in consumption of alcoholic beverages may not
be able to ascertain precisely when the concentration of alcohol in their blood,
breath, or urine reached the proscribed level, they should, in the exercise of
reasonable intelligence, understand what type of conduct places them in jeop-
ardy of violating the [law]."
Id. (quoting State v. Block, 357 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Iowa 1984)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, in THE COMPLETE POETRY AND PROSE OF
WILLIAM BLAKE 33, 37 (D. Erdman ed. 1982).
151. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
152. 749 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
153. Id. at 524.
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uct's dangers.15 4 In a strong dissent, however, one judge argued
that the majority's dismissal of the case was too "sweeping."' 155
The dissent asserted that the manufacturer could be liable for
failing to provide "safety instructions to its consumers about how
much Miller Lite Beer a person could safely consume before be-
coming too inebriated to drive." '156 The dissent would have allowed
the plaintiff's inadequate instruction claim to proceed, although he
seemed to acquiesce in the majority's position toward the plain-
tiff's inadequate warning claim.
"There is an important difference between a manufacturer's
duty to warn and its duty to provide information that will enable
the consumer to use the product with safety," the dissent said.157
"Although general awareness of a product's dangerous characteris-
tics may relieve the product manufacturer of a duty to warn, the
manufacturer may yet have the duty to issue instructions for the
safe use of the product." 158 Because a manufacturer is held to be
an expert regarding its products, it could also be held to have in-
formation "about how many beers a person may consume within a
given time before reaching an illegal state of intoxication .. .
154. Id. at 522.
155. Id. at 524 (Evans, C.J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 525 (Evans, C.J., dissenting). In discussing the many variables that aggravate
the intoxicating effect of alcohol, authors M. Moore and D. Gerstein noted that the number
of these variables produces a complex causal relationship that arguably removes the individ-
ual effects of drinking in a specific situation from the realm of "common knowledge." The
authors said:
[T]he effects [of alcohol] depend on such factors as the spacing of drinks, the
drinker's size and weight, how recently he or she has eaten, his or her own
hopes and expectations about the effects of drinking, and even the expecta-
tions and demands of the people present in addition to the amount consumed.
An excited, skinny teenager anticipating a big night with pals can become
quite exhilaratingly "drunk" on a quantity of alcohol that would produce no
effect... [on] a heavy, middle-aged man who had just finished dinner and had
no greater aspiration than to pass the evening quietly.
M. MOORE & D. GERSTEIN, supra note 8, at 16-17.
157. Malek, 749 S.W.2d at 525 (Evans, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Distinguishing
warnings from instructions, one author said, "[w]arnings call attention to a danger, while
instructions are intended to describe procedures for effective and reasonably safe product
use." Madden, supra note 64, at 224.
158. Malek, 749 S.W.2d at 525 (Evans, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
159. Id. at 524 n.1 (Evans, C.J., dissenting).
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Although the dissent offered an alternate theory of recovery
against alcoholic beverage manufacturers, the reasons that shoot
down inadequate warning claims also shoot down inadequate in-
struction claims. Commentators suggest that the common knowl-
edge of risks plays the same role in both types of claims.6 0 If this
is the case, an inadequate instruction claim serves the plaintiff no
better than an inadequate warning claim. Unless a court is willing
to abstain from deciding as a matter of law the common knowledge
issue, both claims fail. If the court abstains, however, both claims
go forward to the jury.
Weaknesses in the dissent's reasoning in Maguire aside, drunk
driving cases present the strongest argument for dismissing inade-
quate warning and inadequate instruction claims because the argu-
ment that the dangers of drinking and driving are common knowl-
edge is a strong one. After all, one ordinarily becomes aware of
diminishing motor skills simultaneously with the consumption of
the alcohol. However, given the number of factors that affect the
degree of drunkenness one experiences-for example, alcohol could
have a greater effect on an inexperienced drinker of light weight
and with an empty stomach than someone not so situated-" 1 'a
court is presumptuous to decide even this type of common knowl-
edge issue as a matter of law. In all likelihood, the jury will decide
that it is common knowledge that a person who drinks too much
will become drunk and therefore unable to drive. But that deter-
mination should remain where it belongs: with the jury. The jury
should decide the common knowledge issue because what the Re-
statement and the courts confidently assert is common knowledge
is not.
ANALYSIS OF APPROACHES TO INADEQUATE WARNING CLAIMS
The first hurdle in bringing a suit for inadequate warning of the
risks attendant to drinking may be the preemption language of the
160. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
842 (1973). "Instructions are similar to warnings. If the product must be used in a particular
way to be safe and this necessity would not be apparent to the user, adequate instructions
may be required for the product to be duly safe." Id. The author also offers the dangers of
liquor and cigarettes as examples of products that would not require instructions. Id.
161. See supra note 156.
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recently passed Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act.16 2 The Act re-
quires health warnings on alcoholic beverages, but may preempt
state law claims for inadequately warning of those health risks.
The reasoning of several tobacco products liability cases offers a
way around this problem: bring suit only for damages incurred
before the Act's passage. The Act will not preempt a claim for
those damages.
The second and more formidable hurdle is the general bias of
state courts disfavoring inadequate warning claims against alco-
holic beverage manufacturers. These courts take the position that
no duty to warn exists for dangers that are commonly known, and
that the risks of drinking are so commonly known that no duty to
warn of those risks exists as a matter of law. These courts often
cite to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for support.
The Restatement, however, offers no support for its position,
which therefore should be reexamined as nothing more than un-
grounded dicta. Surveys suggest that the Restatement's position is
incorrect. Furthermore, a number of medical authorities and com-
mentators take a stance contrary to the Restatement. Because the
issue is clouded, the question of common knowledge cannot be de-
cided as a matter of law. In fact, the very nature of that in-
quiry-what is generally known among the community-requires a
determination by a jury, which represents the community.
Courts citing to the Restatement generally use it as their sole
authority for deciding that the risks of drinking are common
knowledge. Their analysis, if it can be called that, should be re-
jected simply on grounds of complacency. Medical research has
shattered the presumptions established in the Restatement's com-
ments i and j, which were written more than 20 years ago. Medical
research has uncovered new links between drinking and a variety
of adverse health effects since the drafting of the Restatement.
Courts should never have done so, but are especially wrong now to
rely on the Restatement as an authority of what is and is not com-
monly known.
162. Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 205, 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 4518, 4520 (to be codified at 27 U.S.C. § 216); see supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
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Some courts point to the prevalent use of alcohol throughout
history and the fact that community leaders have long decried the
dangers of drinking to support holding that the dangers of alcohol
are commonly known. This position ignores that many myths
about alcohol consumption have been perpetuated throughout his-
tory. If courts are willing to impute to consumers history's valid
information about alcohol use, they must also be willing to impute
history's misinformation. Furthermore, the historical prevalence of
alcohol use provides no support when an 18-year-old neophyte
drinker consumes too much and dies of acute alcohol poisoning.
Courts should not impute the bulk of knowledge supposedly per-
meating recorded history to someone not exposed to it. This argu-
ment is strongest for many of the adverse effects of long term
drinking, especially when those effects were not known until re-
cently. Even the fact that community leaders speak out regularly
about the dangers of alcohol does not address the specific issue of
whether the community is aware that drinking can triple the risk
of getting a stroke or increase the risk of cancer of the mouth or
throat. Unless community leaders speak specifically of these risks,
and do so with great frequency and to massive audiences, their
speeches do not influence common knowledge of the specific health
consequences that any particular plaintiff suffers.
Furthermore, under a risk/utility analysis, courts should not in-
sulate alcoholic beverage manufacturers from liability as a matter
of law. The utility of drinking is minimal, despite its pervasiveness,
and the risks of drinking are great. The cost of attaching labels to
containers is slight-probably less than the cost of litigating sev-
eral claims, and certainly less than the alcoholic beverage indus-
try's collective advertising budget of $2 billion-' 63 while the poten-
tial benefit of the labels as a tool for public education is clear.
Given these considerations, little justifies preventing a jury from
considering the imposition of liability.
The court in Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co.'64 adopted a good ap-
proach to examining an alcoholic beverage manufacturer's liability
under inadequate warning analysis. After evaluating "social policy
considerations" under a cost/benefit analysis, the judge should
163. Infra note 186.
164. 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987).
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send the case to the jury to determine the issue of common knowl-
edge. Other approaches are less effective for jumping the hurdles
the Restatement imposes. The court in Brune v. Brown Forman
Co. 165 pretended that its ruling did not conflict with the Restate-
ment, but in fact the court ignored language that specifically re-
butted its position. Only by rejecting the Restatement's edict as to
what is commonly known can a court properly send the matter to a
jury when the case involves alcoholic beverages. The Hon approach
is strongest for claims involving adverse health effects of long term
drinking, and can also apply to suits involving acute alcohol
poisoning. This approach is not as strong in drunk driving cases
because it requires the plaintiff to argue that the causal statement
"drinking makes one drunk" is not common knowledge.
Another approach, set forth in the dissenting opinion of Malek
v. Miller Brewing Co.,"8' has problems of its own. The dissent
would have applied inadequate instruction analysis rather than in-
adequate warning analysis, but the underlying premise for both is
basically the same: One is not required to warn of or minimize by
instruction dangers that are commonly known. Even if a court
chooses to apply inadequate instruction analysis, it must still ad-
dress the question of whether the safe use of the product is com-
mon knowledge.
Combining the approaches of the Brune and Hon cases, however,
makes stronger a weak argument for imposing liability when the
danger to be avoided is drunk driving. Brune offers the alternative
of applying inadequate instruction analysis; Hon offers a rejection
of what is and is not commonly known. Under a combined ap-
proach, the plaintiff would argue that the variables of experience,
diet, weight, inherent susceptibility to intoxication, and time span
of consumption create a situation in which the court cannot pre-
sume that a consumer knows how to safely use the defendant's
product without instruction. The consumer cannot know how
much alcohol is too much given the list of variables he or she must
consider. The manufacturer, on the other hand, is held to the level
of an expert, and will have that knowledge imputed to it. The
165. 758 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
166. 749 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (Evans, C.J., dissenting).
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question then becomes whether the manufacturer is liable for fail-
ing to impart that knowledge to the consumer.
In drunk driving cases, as in acute alcohol poisoning cases and
cases involving the effects of long term alcohol use, the most liberal
approach appears in Hon: Allow the court to make a general cost/
benefit analysis and send the case forward to the jury for a deter-
mination of the common knowledge issue on the facts of the case.
Of the three situations discussed-effects of long term alcohol use,
acute alcohol poisoning, and drunk driving-courts are on their
strongest ground when they hold as a matter of law that it is com-
mon knowledge that drinking can make one drunk. Courts are on
shaky ground, however, when they purport to assess, as a matter of
law, the common knowledge of risks of a more arcane medical na-
ture, because many of the strictly medical risks inherent in drink-
ing are not commonly known.
AN ALTERNATE THEORY OF LIABILITY: BREACH OF ExPRESS
WARRANTY
One author defined a warranty' 7 as "a promise on the part of
the seller that a product will possess certain performance, safety,
or quality characteristics. Under warranty, the standard of respon-
sibility is whether the character of the product differs from its im-
plied or express capabilities.' 6 Advertisements may communicate
an implied or express warranty,16 9 according to the author. Fur-
thermore, not all states require reliance on those
representations. 170
The recent judgment in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,71 pro-
vides encouragement for breach of warranty suits, especially in
cases involving extensively advertised products, such as alcoholic
167. Plaintiffs ordinarily bring breach of express warranty claims under a state's
equivalent to the Uniform Commercial Code's § 2-314, which provides that "a warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind." B. CLARK & C. SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT
WARRANTIES § 5.01(1) (1984) (quoting U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1977)). This U.C.C. section con-
templates goods that are unfit for their ordinary purposes and can include manufacturing
and design defects, as well as failure to warn claims. Id. § 12.03(1).
168. L. BAss, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING DEFECTS § 2.07 (1986).
169. Id. § 2.08.
170. Id.
171. 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988).
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beverages, the risks of which are supposedly commonly known and
often held so as a matter of law. Although Cipollone involved a
breach of warranty claim against cigarette manufacturers, it pro-
vides a strong analogy to alcohol cases because of the similarity
between the products. The Restatement (Second) of Torts men-
tions both alcohol and tobacco as products the inherent risks of
which are supposedly commonly known.172 Both products are ad-
dictive, both products involve health risks from long term use, and
the risks of both products have been extensively studied and docu-
mented recently,17 although medical research continues to uncover
risks of both products.
The jury in the Cipollone case awarded $400,000 for the defend-
ants' breach of express warranty as to the safety of their prod-
ucts.17 4 The alleged warranty was that the cigarettes sold would
not cause injury.1 5 The basis for this claim was that the defend-
ants' advertisements suggested that no harm could come from ciga-
rette smoking. 17 6 In an alcoholic beverage case using this approach,
the plaintiff would try to show that the defendant ran advertise-
ments that downplayed or contradicted the risks attendant to alco-
hol consumption. 7 7
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965); see supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the health
effects of tobacco products, see Ross, supra note 76.
174. Cipolone, 693 F. Supp. at 210.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 212-14.
177. Fact findings in a case that did not involve a breach of warranty claim are particu-
larly relevant here. The court in Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa
1986), noted that the defendant's advertisements
depict young people, both male and female, most of whom appear to be in
their twenties. The bartenders are represented in these commercials by older
actors. The characters in the commercials appear to be predominantly blue
collar but some white collar types appear as welcome guests in a friendly, fes-
tive "slice-of-life" drama.
These characters wear working clothes for the most part and talk like "regu-
lar guys." They are gregarious, fun-loving people who express an appreciation
for good friends and "real beer." The setting is always a tavern which is
crowded in a way that suggests popularity. The patrons are always in a highly
festive mood, and the bartender gives strong recommendation to Pabst beer.
The contents of oversized pitchers of frosty amber liquid representing Pabst
draft beer is freely dispensed among the glasses of the assembled patrons. At
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Breach of Warranty Claims in Alcoholic Beverage Cases: Two
Outcomes
Plaintiffs made breach of warranty claims in several recent cases
involving alcoholic beverages, and the claims received distinct
treatment by their respective courts.
In Morris v. Adolph Coors Co.,1 8s which involved a suit against
Adolph Coors Company by a plaintiff whose car was struck by an
18-year-old drunk driver's car, the court's holding was reminiscent
of most inadequate warning cases. The court rejected the plaintiff's
claim and grounded its holding on a determination that the alco-
holic beverage in this case was "safe for consumption."'179 The
court's "reasoning" was no different nor more sound than cases in
which courts have dismissed inadequate warning claims because
the dangers of alcohol consumption were purportedly commonly
known. The court in Morris simply raised another impossible hur-
dle to another cause of action against alcoholic beverage manufac-
turers. Here, the court essentially decided as a matter of law that
alcoholic beverages, despite reams of medical evidence to the con-
trary, s0 are "safe for consumption." The court's only saving grace
is that this case did not involve the health effects of long term al-
cohol use, nor overconsumption-both being situations that refute
the proposition that alcoholic beverages are "safe for
consumption."
In order to recover for breach of an express warranty, the court
in Morris said, the plaintiff must prove:
1) an express affirmation of fact or promise by the seller relat-
ing to the goods;
2) that such affirmation of fact or promise became a part of
the basis of the bargain;
the conclusion of some commercials, one character says to another: "Let's have
another."
Id. at 567-68. The plaintiffs in this case described the defendant's marketing practices "as
an 'invitation to excess,' through exaltation of hedonistic tendencies over good judgment."
Id. at 569. The court in Maguire also noted that Pabst spent more than $50,000,000 on
advertising for its beer in 1982 and 1983. Id. at 568.
178. 735 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
179. Id. at 587.
180. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
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3) that the plaintiff relied upon said affirmation of fact or
promise;
4) that the goods failed to comply with the affirmations of fact
or promise;
5) that the plaintiff was injured by such failure of the product
to comply with the express warranty; and
6) that such failure was the proximate cause of plaintiffs
injury.'8 l
In addition to holding that the plaintiff's claim failed because
alcoholic beverages are safe for consumption, this court held that
the plaintiff's claim failed because the manufacturer's "failure to
provide warnings is not an affirmation of fact or promise. ' 18 2 The
court's "reasoning" missed its mark again, however. The plaintiff's
claim did not rest on the manufacturer's failure to provide warn-
ings as an affirmation of fact or promise. The fact or promise that
the manufacturer affirmed was that its product could be consumed
safely, and the manufacturer's failure to warn otherwise was sim-
ply its failure to prevent its advertisements' implicit affirmation
that the product could be consumed safely. The court in Hon v.
Stroh Brewery Co. 8 ' reached a different result from the Morris
court when the plaintiff in Hon claimed that the defendant's ad-
vertisements created the warranty that drinking its beer was risk-
free.
The plaintiff's husband in Hon died from pancreatitis at the age
of 26, after drinking the defendant's beer for six years."8 The court
noted that
the story boards of Stroh's commercials provide additional evi-
dence from which a jury could conclude that the general public
is unaware of the hazard that allegedly led to Mr. Hon's death.
If a jury finds that Stroh's marketing of its product has effec-
tively taught the consuming public that consumption of beer on
the order of eight to twelve cans of beer per week can be a part
of the "good life" and is properly associated with healthy, robust
activities, this conclusion would be an important consideration
for the jury in determining whether an express warning was nec-
181. Morris, 735 S.W.2d at 587.
182. Id.
183. 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987).
184. Id.
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essary to make Old Milwaukee beer safe for its intended
purpose.185
Supplementing the court's analysis in Hon, another important
consideration in assessing the validity of applying breach of war-
ranty analysis to alcoholic beverage manufacturers is the fact that
alcoholic beverage manufacturers spend roughly two billion dollars
per year on advertising, 186 which far exceeds any reasonable esti-
mate of the cost of warning labels.8 7 One commentator said that
alcoholic beverage ads portray the products as "liquid pathways to
friendship, camaraderie, and virtually all other experiences to
which humans aspire . '. .. "18 8 A glance through almost any maga-
zine, or watching the commercials that run during most sports
events provide the reader with objective support for that
proposition.8 9
Two possible problems with a breach of warranty approach are
that traditional warranty analysis sometimes requires consumer re-
liance on the seller's assurance of the fitness of its product, and
that courts generally do not favor this theory of recovery. 90 If the
consumer did not rely on the advertisements' representations, the
claim will fail in some states.' However, if reliance can be shown
in those states, the claims should be allowed, the preferences of
courts for theories more solidly based in tort notwithstanding.
185. Id. at 514-15 (footnote omitted).
186. See 132 CONG. REC. 16,008, 16,009 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Thur-
mond). Discussing the recently passed federal law mandating alcoholic beverage health
warning labels, Senator Thurmond said that the warnings "will provide some educational
balance to the $2 billion spent each year by the alcohol beverage industry in its product
advertising." Id.
187. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
188. Rubin, supra note 15, at 7.
189. See J. CAVANAGH & F. CLAIRMONTE, ALCOHOLIc BEVERAGES: DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE
POWER (1985) ("In the case of alcohol, advertising technology has been a catalyst of con-
sumption, with all its attendant health-related problems .... Id. at 129-30); TREASURY AND
HHS REPORT, supra note 55, at 34 (Alcoholic beverage advertisements, "particularly the
beer advertisements, associate the use of the product with attractive individuals, enjoyable
activities, and pleasant surroundings, without communicating any of the potential negative
consequences.").
190. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 691-92 (5th ed. 1984).
191. Supra note 170 and accompanying text. The court in Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835
F.2d 510, 514 n.4 (3d Cir. 1987), stated that it would not require reliance.
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Points that support this approach include the fact that the re-
cently passed Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act could preempt in-
adequate warning claims.192 If a plaintiff is also shut off from the
breach of warranty avenue of recovery, he or she has no legal rem-
edy for his or her injury. Also, a breach of express warranty suit
contains an element of the manufacturer's culpability that makes
the claim for redress compelling; breach of warranty is a claim of
misfeasance rather than nonfeasance. Finally, the fact that the leg-
islative history of the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act refers spe-
cifically to not preempting state regulation of alcoholic beverage
advertising'" provides additional support for a breach of express
warranty approach to holding alcoholic beverage manufacturers li-
able for injuries that their products cause.
Analysis of Breach of Warranty Claims
The breach of warranty approach may be the strongest argu-
ment for imposing liability on alcoholic beverage manufacturers,
especially if courts choose to read very broadly the preemption lan-
guage in the recently passed alcoholic beverage health warning law.
Because a claim for breach of express warranty does not involve
labeling requirements, such a claim should not conflict with any
federal labeling mandate, and therefore should not be preempted.
In some states, however, a plaintiff must still prove that the manu-
facturer prompted the injured party to rely on suggestions that the
alcoholic beverage posed no adverse health consequences. Under
this approach, as in inadequate warning or instruction claims, the
defendant may argue that the plaintiff knew the risks and there-
fore cannot justify his reliance on the manufacturer's contrary
statements or implications. At least in breach of warranty claims,
however, the Restatement (Second) of Torts does not prevent the
issue of the plaintiff's knowledge from reaching the jury.""
192. See supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 7-8, 47-51 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Alcoholic beverages unquestionably pose serious and substantial
health risks. Furthermore, the connections between many of the
risks and their alcoholic sources are arcane and beyond the realm
of common knowledge. In fact, many of the causal links have only
recently come within the ken of modern medical science. Relying
on the ungrounded dicta of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and holding that the risks involved are within common knowledge
as a matter of law transcend the bounds of reason.
Recently passed federal legislation recognizes the unreasonable-
ness of such reliance. If the risks of consuming alcohol were com-
mon knowledge, Congress would have no reason to warn the public
of those risks. Furthermore, despite any potential preemptive ef-
fect of the legislation on inadequate warning claims, courts can at
least allow products liability claims for injuries suffered before the
federal law's enactment. If courts continue to balk at inadequate
warning claims because of misplaced confidence in what consti-
tutes common knowledge, however, plaintiffs should use breach of
warranty claims for redress of their injuries. Those claims generally
require only a showing that the defendant's advertising down-
played the risks of alcohol consumption, and that the claim does
not conflict with the contemplated federal legislation.
Clay Campbell
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